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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
become judicially accepted, and whether new jurisdictional tests
of "in interstate commerce" lying outside the act's definition
will emerge. If so, the FPC will have jurisdiction to the exclu-
sion of state authorities without the necessity of finding bur-
dens on interstate commerce in each case. Such a course
would seem to suppress knowledge of the effects of industry
practices and rate making upon producers, carriers, and con-
sumers alike, and render litigation in this area less curative,
causing proponents and opponents of federal or state power to
suffer undisclosed inefficiencies, the ascertainment of which, it
is submitted, would be welcomed by all.
David S. Bell*
MINERAL LEASE CANCELLATION FOR FAILURE TO
PAY PRODUCTION ROYALTY
INTRODUCTION
Recent decisions of the Second Circuit in Bailey v. Meadows'
and of the Third in Pierce v. Atlantic Refining Co. 2 cancelling
mineral leases because of the lessee's failure to commence pay-
ment of production royalty have caused great concern in the
Louisiana oil and gas industry. This comment will undertake
both a conceptual and practical analysis of this problem.
BACKGROUND
The mineral lease is the instrument used most frequently in
the commercial development of Louisiana's oil and gas resources.
No special body of legislation governs this unique type of con-
tract. Consequently, development of the law in this field has
been left largely to the courts, which have analogically applied
the Civil Code articles on predial leases to the mineral lease.s
In addition to the general requirements that a valid contract
*Writer worked as research assistant to Special Counsel for the Louisiana
Public Service Commission in preparation of an application for rehearing of
United Gas Pipe Line Co., Docket No. CP62-161 (Aug. 26, 1963).
1. 130 So. 2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961), writs denied.
2. 140 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), writs denied.
3. Melancon v. Texas Co., 230 La. 593, 89 So. 2d 135 (1956) ; Milling v. Col-
lector of Revenue, 220 La. 773, 57 So. 2d 679 (1952) ; Coyle v. North American
Oil Consol., 201 La. 99, 9 So. 2d 473 (1942) ; Tyson v. Surf Oil Co., 195 La.
248, 196 So. 336 (1940).
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refer to a thing certain and result from valid consent,4 a predial
lease must be for a term (less than perpetuity) 5 during which
the lessee may enjoy the land,6 and for a certain and determinate
price, 7 which is the rent to be paid under the lease. A mineral
lease normally provides for a term varying from three to ten
years with extensions beyond the primary term permitted upon
the occurrence of certain conditions such as active drilling, con-
structive production,8 or actual production. Although the ulti-
mate term may not be definitive in years at the outset, it is
made certain and less than perpetuity by these conditions. Rent
is likewise determinable only in relation to these conditions, and
thus depends upon whether the lease is being maintained by
delay rentals, shut-in payments, or production royalty, and in
the latter case, the amount of production.
Contract Cancellation - Putting in Default. - Cancellation
of a predial lease, according to the Civil Code, is generally gov-
erned by the rules relating to dissolution of contracts.9 Normal-
ly, contracts are dissolved by occurrence of either an express or
an implied resolutory condition. The express resolutory condi-
tion is an express agreement providing for termination upon
the occurrence of a stated contingency.10 It may, but need not
necessarily, be the failure of one party to perform his contrac-
tual obligations. On the other hand, an implied resolutory con-
dition, which takes effect on failure of either party to fulfill his
contractual obligations, is statutorily incorporated into every
contract. 1
4. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2670 (1870).
5. Id. art. 2780. Should the duration of the term ,be in perpetuity the con-
tract is not a lease, but rather a contract of rent of lands.
6. Id. art. 2674.
7. Id. arts. 2670, 2671, 2674.
8. When a well (usually gas) is capable of producing but cannot because of
unavailability of markets or delays in granting a selling license by the Federal
Power Commission, the normal oil and gas lease provides that the lease may be
maintained by the payment of shut-in rentals or royalties. These royalties, in
lieu of actual production royalties, are considered constructive production royal-
ties.
9. Id. art. 2729 provides for dissolution of the lease for breach of an engage-
ment by either the lessee or lessor "in the manner expressed concerning contracts
in general." The article imposes, however, one limitation- the judge may not
permit any delay in the dissolution as he may do with contracts in general under
article 2047.
10. Id. art. 2026: "They [conditions] are express, when they appear in the
contract ....
11. Id. art. 2046: "A resolutory condition is implied in commutative contracts,
to take effect, in case either of the parties do not comply with his engagements;
in this case the contract is not dissolved of right; the party complaining of a
breach of the contract may either sue for its dissolution with damages, or, if the
circumstances of the case permit, demand a specific performance."
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The Civil Code distinguishes between express resolutory con-
ditions which are dependent upon the will or volition of the par-
ties and those which are not. Occurrence of the latter termi-
nates a contract "of right."'12 On the other hand, dissolution
grounded on the occurrence of the former, as well as on an im-
plied resolutory condition, must be demanded judicially and is
subject to the court's discretion.18 It should be noted, however,
that in addition to the discretionary control in these cases, 14 the
jurisprudence reveals that the courts have exercised a certain
amount of control over dissolution resulting from express reso-
lutory conditions not dependent on the will of the parties as
well. 5
A real distinction, however, is apparently drawn by the juris-
prudence between express and implied resolutory conditions
with regard to putting in default.'6 If the resolutory condition
is express, the courts do not require default as a prerequisite to
12. Id. art. 2047: "In all cases the dissolution of a contract may be demanded
by suit or by exception; and when the resolutory condition is an event, not de-
pending on the will of either party, the contract is dissolved of right; but, in
other cases, it must be sued for, and the party in default may, according to cir-
cumstances, have a further time allowed for the performance of the condition."
See article 2046 at note 11 supra.
13. Ibid.
14. The Supreme Court in Watson v. Feibel, 139 La. 375, 392, 71 So. 585, 591
(1916) declared: "[N]othing can bring into a stronger light the true spirit and
intent of our law . .. than that provision of Article 2047 by which the whole
matter of allowing dissolution or not, or of granting further time or not, is left
to the judge, so that the dissolution of the contract never does become a matter
of absolute right on the part of the creditor." That this principle has been
applied to leases is evidenced by the court's statement that "the right to dissolve
a lease is subject to judicial control according to circumstances." Rudnick v.
Union Producing Co., 209 La. 943, 950, 25 So. 2d 906, 908 (1946) ; Edwards
v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 175 La. 720, 723, 144 So. 430, 431 (1932).
See also Brewer v. Forest Gravel Co., 172 La. 828, 135 So. 372 (1931). But see
LA. Cir CODE art. 2729 (1870), which declares that a judge cannot order any
delay in the dissolution of a lease.
15. Although persuading the court to allow further time for performance is
a greater task in cases of violation of express resolutory conditions than in cases
of violation of implied ones, the Supreme Court is steadfast in upholding judicial
control of dissolution even when the contract contains an express condition and
automatic termination clause. In Southport Mill v. Ansley, 160 La. 131, 142,
106 So. 720, 723 (1925), the court declared that whether the contract contained
an express resolutory condition or the implied statutory condition the contract
is "no more dissolved of right in the one case than in the other." Elaborating,
the court continued: "[I]n all other [there are some statutory exceptions]
commutative contracts the delinquent party . . .may be given further delay at
the discretion of the judge, even though not entitled thereto of right." Id. at
142, 106 So. at 724. Accord, Watson v. Feibel, 139 La. 375, 71 So. 585 (1916)
Turner v. Collins, 2 Mart.(N.S.) 605 (1824).
16. Southport Mill v. Ansley, 160 La. 131, 142, 106 So. 720, 723 (1925)
"[T]he only effect of such a clause (express resolutory condition] in a contract
is merely to waive a formal putting in default; such putting in default being
otherwise necessary before suing for a dissolution of the contract."
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suit to enforce the condition and cancel the contract.'7 Converse-
ly, the majority of Louisiana courts hold that a suit for dissolu-
tion and damages based on an implied resolutory condition must
be preceded by a putting in default 8 unless there was an "ac-
tive" breach of the contract.19 Therefore, whether a putting in
default is a prerequisite to dissolution depends on whether the
resolutory condition is express or implied, and in the latter case,
whether the breach was active or passive. Default is necessary
only for dissolution based on a passively breached contract en-
gagement which does not contain an express resolutory condi-
tion.20
Article 2712 - Summary Eviction - Default. - While the
Civil Code provides that leases in general are dissolved in the
same manner as ordinary contracts, 21 there are two significant
variations. First, the Code provides that while the judge may
permit additional time for performance in suits for dissolution
of ordinary contracts, he may not do so when suit is brought for
cancellation of a lease. 22 Second, articles 2712 and 2713 appar-
ently provide for a summary eviction of the lessee without put-
ting in default for nonpayment of rent when due after notice to
quit the premises.28
17. Southport Mill v. Ansley, 160 La. 131, 106 So. 720 (1926). The delay
rental clause of most standard lease forms contains an express resolutory condi-
tion. Since Talley v. Lawhon, 150 La. 25, 90 So. 427 (1922), the jurisprudence
has held that default is not a prerequisite to suit for dissolution for passive
violation of this lease clause.
A suit for enforcement of an express resolutory condition seems conceptually
to be one for specific performance of the agreement. There is substantial au-
thority holding that default is not required in suits for specific performance.
J. F. Auderer Labs v. Deas, 223 La. 923, 67 So. 2d 179 (1953) ; Healy v. South-
ern States Alcohol Co., 136 La. 1080, 68 So. 132 (1915) ; New Orleans & N. R.R.
v. Ganalh & Co., 18 La. 510 (1841) ; Cain v. Blackwell, 157 So. 286 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1934).
18. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1912, 1932, 1933 (1870); Temple v. Lindsay, 182
La. 22, 161 So. 8 (1935) ; Doiron v. Calcasieu Oil Co., 172 La. 553, 134 So. 742
(1931) ; Caldwell v. Alton Oil Co., 161 La. 139, 108 So. 314 (1926) ; Pipes v.
Payne, 156 La. 791, 101 So. 144 (1924) ; Watson v. Feibel, 139 La. 375, 71
So. 585 (1916) ; Erwin v. Fenwick, 6 Mart.(N.S.) 229 (1827). But see text at
note 66 8upra, where the Supreme Court declared that default is a prerequisite
only for suits for delay damages.
19. Noel Estate v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp,. 188 La. 45, 175 So. 744(1937) ; Berie v. Texas & P. Ry., 37 La. Ann. 468 (1885) ; Levy v. Schwartz,
34 La. Ann. 209 (1882) ; Shepard v. Hero, 11 Orl. App. 340 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1914).
20. See notes 15-18 supra. Apparently if the lessee formally tenders the rent
even though after maturity, but prior to formal default (if necessary) or to the
filing of a suit for dissolution or dissolution and ejectment the lessor has no
cause of action on the delinquent payment. Edwards v. Standard Oil Co. v.
Louisiana, 175 La. 720, 144 So. 430 (1932).
21. See note 9 supra.
22. See note 9 supra.
23. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2712 (1870) : "The lessee may be expelled from the
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It may be argued that the lessor's right to dissolve the lease
without putting the lessee in default under article 2712 is a
special remedy for lessors which should take precedence over
the general principles governing dissolution.2 4 This article may
contemplate that putting in default to recover each month's rent
as it comes due certainly would be onerous in ordinary situa-
tions. Consequently, dissolution without prior default may be
permissible, thus making the lessor's right to dissolve the lease
under article 2712 equivalent to an express resolutory condi-
tion.2 5 Compliance with the requirements of the Code of Civil
Procedure for summary eviction would seem to be the only pre-
requisite to assertion of this right to evict the lessee.2 6 There-
fore, it seems that the general rules concerning active and pas-
sive breach of contract are inapplicable in this situation. Par-
property if he fails to pay the rent when it becomes due."
Id. art. 2713: "When the lessor has given notice to the lessee, in the manner
directed by law, to quit the property, and the lessee persists in remaining on it,
the lessor may have him summoned before a judge or a justice of the peace, and
condemned to depart .... "
The "notice" as "directed by law" is covered in the Code of Civil Procedure
in the case of leases with a specific term and the Civil Code in the case of a
lease without a term. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 4701: "When a lessee's
right of occupancy has ceased because of . . . non-payment of rent . . . and the
lessor wishes to obtain possession of the premises, the lessor or his agent shall
cause written notice to vacate the premises to be delivered to the lessee. The
notice shall allow the lessee not less than five days from the date of its delivery
to vacate the leased premises.
"If the lease has no definite term, the notice required by law for its termina-
tion shall be considered as a notice to vacate under this article. If the lease has
a definite term, notice to vacate may be given not more than thirty days before
the expiration of the term." LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2685 and 2687 establish terms
by law for those leases which do not specify any-a month for houses or apart-
ments and a year for "predial estates." Article 2686 provides for ten days' notice
to vacate in such situations.
24. Summary eviction under article 2712 appears to be a special exception
to the general mode of terminating leases under article 2729. The possibility of
eviction and lease cancellation for nonpayment without prior default under 2712
exists, and not infrequently courts refer to a "peremptory" right to dissolution
under this article. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp. v. Cozart, 163 La. 90, 111 So.
610 (1927); Gaar v. Prudhomme, 181 So. 604 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938). This
designation is, however, apparently in reference to the summary eviction pro-
cedure available against a delinquent lessee, rather than to the default require-
ment. Kron v. Watson, 14 La. Ann. 432 (1859); Hennen v. Hayden & Kelly,
5 La. Ann. 713 (1850). As further evidence see note 30 infra for cases brought
under article 2712 in which putting in default was required. See Comment,
Landlord and Tenant: Summary Ejectment in Louisiana, 21 TUL. L. REV. 256
(1946).
25. Suit could be brought to evict the lessee and cancel the lease without
requiring formal default, resulting in a situation analogous to that encountered
when suit is brought to enforce an express resolutory condition.
26. Under the provisions of LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE arts. 4701-4705,
4731-4735 (1961) a lessee in possession who fails to pay his rent when due may
be judicially evicted and have the lease cancelled in less than ten days, thus by-
passing the longer period necessary for proceedings via ordinaria when the suit
is only for cancellation of the lease.
COMMENTS
ticularly the question of default does not seem pertinent when a
lessor seeks possession for nonpayment of rent.
If correct, these conclusions would seem applicable regard-
less of whether the lessor seeks possession by ordinary proceed-
ings through suit for dissolution or through the summary evic-
tion process. The only material distinction between the two
modes of proceeding is one of time. The codes have provided a
summary eviction procedure in obvious recognition of the fact
that the ordinary landlord desires to recover possession and
make his property economically productive again within the
shortest possible time. If he elects to proceed via ordinaria,
there should be no distinction made in default requirements.
The above observations, however, are based upon an assump-
tion that there is a time appointed for payment of the rent,
either by contract or by custom.2 7 If no time is appointed, it is
logical to conclude that a demand is necessary to fix a time when
payment is expected. Eviction could be procured in such cases
only upon passage of the date fixed by demand.
Although these conclusions appear compelled by the the-
oretical structure of the Civil Code, the jurisprudence
seemingly is not in accord. The prohibition against discretion-
ary control of dissolution is apparently not observed.2 In addi-
tion, the jurisprudence requires a putting in default as a pre-
requisite to suit by ordinary proceedings for cancellation of both
predial and mineral leases under article 2712 when the obliga-
tion is passively breached. 29 Furthermore, putting in default is
required even when summary eviction is sought under article
2712, at least for predial leases.30
27. Civil Code article 2712 obliges the lessee to pay the rent "when it becomes
due." This due date may be established by agreement of the parties in the lease,
or by impliedly incorporating a customary due date into the lease. Although Civil
Code articles 2685 and 2687 establish the term of a lease when one is not fixed
by the parties, the Code apparently establishes no date for payment of rent
when one is not determined by the parties.
28. See notes 14 and 15 supra and note 77 infra. The integrity of the Civil
Code could be maintained by distinguishing between granting "delay of the dis-
solution" and denying dissolution "according to the circumstances." However,
no court has yet made this distinction, and in light of the long line of juris-
prudence permitting extensive judicial control of dissolution, it may be doubted
that article 2729 will be given full effect.
29. Pierce v. Atlantic Refining Co., 140 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962)
Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So. 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961); Melancon v. Texas
Co., 230 La. 593, 89 So. 2d 135 (1956); Brown v. Sugar Creek Syndicate, 195
La. 865, 197 So. 583 (1940) assume that default is a prerequisite to suit for
dissolution for a passive violation of article 2712.
30. In Bacas v. Mandot, 3 Orl. App. 324 (1906), a suit for summary eviction
of a predial lease after classifying a delinquent rent payment as a passive breach
19641
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The availability of eviction procedures to mineral lessors is
a matter which has received little judicial attention, but one re-
cent case has permitted use of the summary proceeding to ef-
fect eviction of a gravel lessee.81 Although the cause for eviction
was not failure to pay rent but lapse of the term, the Code of
Civil Procedure contemplates that eviction may be had for non-
payment of rent as well.8 2
Consequently, it appears that although on the basis of the
Code a sound argument may be made that default is not a requi-
site to suits for lease cancellation for nonpayment of rent at the
time due, the jurisprudence requires default in such cases. Ad-
ditionally, where no time for payment is fixed, even theoretic-
ally a demand for performance should be required. Thus, for
practical analysis of the problem it must be assumed that ar-
ticle 2712 as interpreted does not free a lessor of the burden of
formal default when otherwise required by the jurisprudence.
MINERAL LEASE RENT PAYMENTS
Principally there are three types of mineral lease rentals
which may be paid in addition to the initial payment (bonus)18
- delay rentals, shut-in payments, and production royalty.
Delay Rentals. - A delay rental is a payment generally due
of contract, the court continued: "[F]or the obligee to avail of such passive
violation, either by a demand for dissolution or for damages, he must put the
obligor in mora." Id. at 327; Ricou v. Hart, 47 La. Ann. 1370, 17 So. 878
(1895). See Comment, 2 LA. L. REV. 161, 164 (1939).
31. Sharpe v. Jenkins, 150 So. 2d 353 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963). Under the
Code of Civil Procedure (see note 23 supra) summary eviction is available
against a lessee in possession of the leased premises. Without belaboring the
point, the court in Sharpe correctly viewed a mineral lessee (sand and gravel
lease) as in possession through his presence on and mineral production from the
leased premises. It would not seem to be stretching analogical reasoning to hold
that a mineral lessee (oil and gas lease) would similarly by production from the
leased premises meet the requirement of possession.
32. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 4701 (1960), note 23 supra.
33. The bonus is the rent for the first year and additionally part of the con-
sideration for the entire primary term. It is in a sense a prepaid rent and is the
only rent payment which the lessor is certain to receive.
The author has assumed that the term of a mineral lease is that period for
which the lease is maintainable by the payment of delay rentals.
Possibly the term is only for the initial year with the lessee having an option
to renew the lease for an additional year by making the proper payment of delay
rentals. If this is the proper conceptual analysis, cancellation without putting
in default would be permitted even in the absence of an automatic cancellation
clause, for article 2727 of the Code provides that the lease ceases at the expira-
tion of the "term." This question, although admittedly academic, is apparently
solved by the will of the parties expressed in the lease to the effect that the
contract is to have a primary term of so many years, but which may be termi-
nated prior to this should the lessee fail to meet the delay rental requirement.
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on or before the aniversary date of the lease which permits the
lessee to defer drilling for the succeeding year. The delay rental
clause of a mineral lease universally contains an automatic
termination provision, which terminates the lease upon failure
to make timely payment.3 4 Since the termination provision is an
express resolutory condition, suit for cancellation requires no
precedent putting in default.35 Absent an automatic termination
provision, the Code and jurisprudence would seem to require
that cancellation for failure to pay the rent be governed by the
active-passive breach dichotomy outlined above ;36 however, the
express resolutory condition eliminates the necessity for refer-
ence to these general concepts.
Shut-in Rentals. - A second form of rent, commonly called
shut-in royalty or rent,3 7 permits a lessee to maintain the lease
after shutting in a gas well capable of production until a market
or marketing facilities are obtained. The payment may be
termed "royalty" and paid on the basis of a set amount per shut-
in well, or the lease may provide for commencement or resump-
tion of delay rentals as the requisite shut-in payment. Though
there is no decision in point, reference to the delay rentals in the
shut-in payments clause may be deemed to continue in effect the
automatic termination provision of the delay rental clause.
When the shut-in provision defines the payment as royalty, the
jurisprudence, although lacking in specificity, apparently ap-
plies the general concepts regarding active and passive
breaches.38 This, of course, necessitates default unless the fail-
ure can in some way be characterized as an active breach of
contract.
34. Johnson v. Smallenberger, 237 La. 11, 110 So. 2d 119 (1959) ; Atlantic
Refining Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 217 La. 576, 46 So. 2d 907 (1950) ; Clingman v.
Devonian Oil Co., 188 La. 310, 177 So. 59 (1937) ; LeRosen v. North Central
Texas Oil Co., 167 La. 1076, 120 So. 862 (1929).
35. See note 16 supra.
36. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2729 (1870) : "The neglect of the lessor or lessee to
fulfill his engagements, may also give cause for a dissolution of the lease, in the
manner expressed concerning contracts in general .... "
37. The synonymic use of "rent" and "royalty" is not with reference to owner-
ship of the proceeds in a contest between royalty owners and parties holding
interests from the lessor; rather it has reference to the general classification of
royalty as a form of rent due under a mineral lease. Milling v. Collector of
Revenue, 220 La. 773, 57 So. 2d 679 (1952) and summary of cases contained
therein.
38. Risinger v. Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co., 198 La. 101, 3 So. 2d 289 (1941);
Moses, Problems in Connection with Shut-in Gas Royalty Provisions in Oil and
Gas Leases, 23 TUL. L. REV. 374, 377 (1949) declares that Risinger, in the light
of Brown v. Sugar Creek Syndicate, 195 La. 865, 197 So. 583 (1940), supports
the proposition that "mere non-payment of royalty [including shut-in royalty]
is not ground for cancellation of the lease unless the lease so specifically states."
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Production Royalty. - A third form of rent which may be
due under a mineral lease is production royalty - a certain frac-
tion of the production due the lessor which constitutes the con-
sideration for the lease while there is production from the leased
property. The normal lease form makes no provision for auto-
matic termination for lack of payment of either initial or subse-
quent production royalties. Consequently, if cancellation is
sought on the grounds of untimely payment, reference must be
made to the general concepts of active and passive breaches.
The application of these provisions is complicated, however,
since the normal lease form makes no provisions for determin-
ing the date on which the initial payment is due and an industry
custom has not evolved which might be said to have been im-
pliedly incorporated into the lease2 9 This absence of a due date
for initial royalty payments has created numerous problems con-
cerning the lessor's right to cancellation for delay in commenc-
ing production royalty payments. Foremost are questions con-
cerning determination of when the obligation is breached, and
whether failure to pay is an active or passive breach. Reason-
ing analogically from the treatment accorded delay rentals, shut-
in payments and contracts in general, it would seem that in the
absence of an express resolutory condition mere inactivity-
failure to pay - is a passive breach of contract. However,
Bailey v. Meadows and Pierce v. Atlantic Refining Co., decided
by the Second and Third Circuits respectively, indicate that this
failure may be classified as an active breach, which requires no
putting in default precedent to suit for cancellation of the lease.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to an analysis of these
cases and their ramifications.
ANALYSIS OF THE JURfSPRUDENCE
Melancon v. Texas Co. - The leading case in the area is the
Supreme Court decision in Melancon v. Texas Co.40 In an at-
39. LA. CIVIL CODE, art. 2050 (1870) provides that "when no term is fixed
by the parties for the performance of the obligation, it may be executed im-
mediately, unless, from the nature of the act, a term, either certain or uncertain,
must be applied." Article 1964 declares that when the intent of the parties is
not evident, "usage" may be determinative. Article 1966 defines "usage" as used
in article 1964 as "that which is generally practiced in affairs of the same nature
with that which form the subject of the contracts." A well-recognized custom
for monthly payment of production royalty after the initial payment has de-
veloped in the industry. More recently royalty division orders have incorporated
an express provision providing for payment on a certain day each month for
the preceding month's production. Consequently the payment date may be gov-
erned by industry custom (under older division orders) or convention (under
newer division orders).
40. 230 La. 593, 89 So. 2d 135 (1956).
[Vol. XXIV
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tempt to force its lessor to agree to an alteration of a voluntary
unit, defendant lessee refused to make any royalty payments for
fifteen months following production despite the lessor's repeat-
ed inquiry into the delay. The court held that no formal default
was required because the lessee's conduct constituted an active
breach of the lease.
Prior jurisprudence had declared that formal default was a
requisite to cancellation for nonperformance of a mineral lease
obligation without a term41 (which the obligation to commence
payments of royalty certainly is), and that delinquent rent pay-
ment in predial leases 42 and failures to pay production royalty
in mineral leases were passive breaches requiring a putting in
default. 43 Consequently the Supreme Court, with great specifi-
city, explained how the lessee's failure to pay production royalty
in this case was classified as an active breach. The case was
distinguished from the prior jurisprudence on the basis that the
nonperformance was not the result of negligence or mere inad-
vertence, but rather it was a wilful, studied, and purposeful
nonfeasance designed to harass the lessor economically. 44 Such
41. Temple v. Lindsay, 182 La. 22, 161 So. 8 (1935) (no specified term for
performance of obligation to drill -default a prerequisite to suit for dissolution) ;
Pipes v. Payne, 156 La. 791, 101 So. 144 (1924) (no term for drilling additional
wells in diligent development clause-default required).
42. Ricou v. Hart, 47 La. Ann. 1370, 17 So. 878 (1895) ; Fox v. McKee, 31
La. Ann. 67 (1879) ; Hennen v. Hayden & Kelly, 5 La. Ann. 713 (1850) ; Hyde
v. Palmer & Southmayd, 12 La. 359 (1838) ; Bacas v. Mandot, 3 Orl. App. 324
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1906); cf. Edwards v. Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana, 175
La. 720, 144 So. 430 (1932).
43. Brown v. Sugar Creek Syndicate, 195 La. 865, 894, 197 So. 583, 592
(1940) : "In the absence of a demand for payment of the royalties and any provi-
sion in the lease giving the lessors the right to cancel the leases for non-payment
of royalties, the first ground urged by the plaintiffs [cancellation for non-payment
of production royalties] must fall." (Emphasis added.)
44. 230 La. 593, 606, 89 So. 2d 135, 139 (1956). The court reemphasized its
agreement with this conclusion of the trial court: "Defendant's contention that
there was no 'formal demand,' that such demand is a necessary preliminary to
a refusal to pay, and that in its absence the forfeiture would not be warranted,
is not persuasive in the face of the finding of the trial judge, and of our con-
firmation of his finding, of the defendant's active violation of its obligations
under the lease." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 615, 89 So. 2d at 142. Though the
equitable result reached cannot seriously be questioned, the detrimental effect
on the traditional distinction between active and passive breaches- doing some-
thing from not doing something-may be one reservation to acceptance of the
decision. The court's conclusion is that doing nothing in bad faith is an active
breach. Although it may be logically argued that such conduct is inconsistent
with a lessee's obligations and is therefore an active breach, the Civil Code
apparently creates a different remedy for such conduct. The Code does not state
that a bad faith breach is an active breach; rather it is addressed to the aspect
of damages not characterization of the breach. Article 1934(2) provides that
when a contract has been breached in bad faith, the damages are not restricted
to those reasonably contemplated by the parties. Seemingly bad faith vel non is
not material to the classification of the breach.
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conduct was clearly inconsistent with the lessee obligations and
consequently was readily classified as an active breach which
eliminated the necessity for a putting in default.
Bailey v. Meadows - Pierce v. Atlantic Refining Co. - The
subsequent Bailey and Pierce cases, interpreting the Supreme
Court decision, concluded that Melancon "enunciated a general
rule that failure to pay production royalties under an ofl and
gas lease, for any appreciable length of time, without justifica-
tion, amounts to an active breach of such lease which entitles
the lessor to a cancellation thereof without the necessity of plac-
ing the lessee in formal default. '45 In Bailey v. Meadows 46 the
lessee knowingly had not paid initial royalty for nearly two
years following production while attempting to effect a unit op-
erating agreement, but there was no evidence of a wilful failure
to pay in the Melancon sense. In Pierce v. Atlantic Refining
Co. 47 the delay in payment of seven months following produc-
tion was apparently again not purposeful but rather resulted
solely from negligence. 4
Analysis - Regardless of the equity of the decisions, the in-
terpretation of Melancon in Bailey and Pierce seems to be in
error. The Supreme Court said that a certain type of bad faith
nonfeasance - refusal to pay rent used as a weapon of economic
coercion - is an active breach of the lessee's obligation. The
courts in Bailey and Pierce state that any nonfeasance when for
"an appreciable length of time" and "without justification" is
an active breach. Certainly the latter principle is not merely a
restatement of the former.
Not only does the rule announced in Bailey and Pierce lack
precedential foundation in Melancon, but also the conduct de-
clared to be an active breach does not properly fit the conceptual
mold required for such characterization. Article 1931 of the
Civil Code defines an active breach of an obligation as "doing
something inconsistent with the obligation"; a passive breach
45. Pierce v. Atlantic Refining Co., 140 So. 2d 19, 29 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962) ; Bailey v. Meadows, 130 So. 2d 501, 508 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
46. 130 So. 2d 501 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
47. 140 So. 2d 19 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
48. It is noteworthy that the Louisiana federal courts have refused to ascribe
to Melancon the interpretation given it by Pierce and Bailey. Bonsall v. Humble
Oil & Refining Co., 201 F. Supp. 516 (W.D. La. 1961) (court declared that
Melancon did not stand for the proposition that fifteen months' delay in produc-
tion royalty payments was an active breach of the obligation) ; Touchet v. Humble
Oil & Refining Co., 191 F. Supp. 291 (W.D. La. 1960) (default required in
dissolution suit grounded in failure to pay production royalties).
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is characterized as "not doing what was covenanted to be done,
or not doing it at the time, or in the manner stipulated or im-
plied from the nature of the contract." The passive-active
breach dichotomy and the corresponding default requirements
distinguish activity from inactivity,49 or as the Supreme Court
describes it, feasance from nonfeasance.50 By incorporating non-
feasance intended as economic duress into the active breach cate-
gory, Melancon somewhat widened the periphery of the active
breach concept. The Bailey and Pierce nonfeasance, however,
lacking the element of wilful or purposeful nonfeasance, can
hardly be considered active in any sense.
Despite the fact that no clear pattern has yet developed from
these royalty cases, it seems that what the appellate courts are
actually doing is creating an inference of presumption of'wilful
nonpayment. If payment is not commenced within what the
court considers an "appreciable" time, an inference or presump-
tion of wilfulness arises which evidences an active breach of the
lease - a view which originates with Melancon but is substan-
tially extended by presumption. That this presumption is re-
buttable, however, is evidenced by the second element of the
courts' decisions - justification. The presumption of wilfulness
will control only if the lessee is unable to justify the delay.
It seems, however, that mere tardiness of performance
should not affect the characterization of the breach; Civil Code
article 1931 categorically declares that an obligation is passively
violated by not performing it at the time stipulated or implied
in the contract. Nor is there any authority to the effect that
lack of justification for the delinquency converts a passive
breach into an active one.,' It is wilfulness, not mere tardiness,
49. Noel Estate v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp., 188 La. 45, 50, 175 So. 744,
746 (1937) : "The word 'doing' as it is used in article 1931 of the Code signifies
activity, and the words 'not doing' signify inactivity or failure to do something."
SAUNDERS, LECTURES ON THE CIVIL CODE 400 (1925) : "The passive violation of
contract exists where the defendant simply does nothing." Sarpy, The Putting in
Default as a Prerequisite to Suit in Louisiana, 1 LOYOLA L. REV. 127, 140
(1942) : "A passive breach take place when the obligor simply does nothing
where the contract requires him to do something."
50. In Melancon the court described the lessee's conduct as "studied and
purposeful non-feasance." 230 La. 593, 606, 89 So. 2d 135, 139 (1956).
51. No case was discovered declaring that justification or lack of it could not
alter the characterization of a breach of contract from passive to active; however,
this seems to be a necessary conclusion to this writer. The Code clearly dis-
tinguishes an active breach from a passive one on the basis of conduct versus
no-conduct. Nowhere is there provision incorporating the mental intent of the
violating obligor at the time of the violation into the test for distinguishment.
It is admitted that when an obligor expressly refuses to perform or wilfully
delays in performance this mental attitude permits suit without default, but
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which controlled in Melancon. Therefore, wilfulness, not mere
tardiness, should be the necessary finding of fact upon which
the active breach classification depends.
5 2
Evaluation.- The first problem which arises in connection
with the Bailey-Pierce doctrine is what will constitute an "ap-
preciable length of time." Certainly a period of two years, as in
Bailey, seems appreciable. However, the period of seven months
involved in Pierce comes close to the area of reasonableness.5
Whether the courts will adopt some arbitrary standard or will
determine what is an appreciable length of time on a case-to-
case basis according to evidence of justification presented by
the lessee is unclear.54
What then constitutes evidence sufficient to justify the ap-
preciable delay? Obviously, the fact that the lessee in Bailey
these are exceptions to the general rule of default when the obligor has merely
failed to perform. Southern Sawmill Co. v. Ducote, 120 La. 1052, 46 So. 20
(1908) ; Abels v. Glover, 15 La. Ann. 247 (1869) ; McWilliams v. Flanagan,
Orl. App. No. 7586 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1919) ; Milam-Morgan Co. v. Atlantic
Fruit Co, 12 Orl. App. 306 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1915). Justification should be a
pertinent inquiry first, in determining whether the court will consider the
obligor's conduct in fact a breach of contract, and second, in determining whether
the court will excuse the breach should one be found; but in neither case does
it relate to the classification of the breach.
52. If unjustified delay is declared to be an active breach, the connecting link
between the nonperformance and its active breach classification is eliminated
and thus serious doubts concerning the proper conceptual characterization of
the conduct are raised. The courts in Bailey and Pierce declared that the tardi-
ness without justification itself constituted an active breach of the lease. If the
courts are in fact reasoning analogically from the wilful conduct element in
Melancon, this should be stated clearly to effect a more accurate conceptual
basis for the cases.
53. This writer's interviews with experienced practitioners indicate that
under present custom and practice six months' delay in the initial payment is
not normally unreasonable. This approximate standard permits the normal delays
required for final title examination and surveys, negotiation of a production
purchase agreement, and circulation of royalty division orders. Though most title
investigations and unit surveys are completed prior to drilling, where a unit is
created by a Conservation Commission order subsequent curative work and sur-
veying, incapable of anticipation, may be required. Additionally, most purchasers
do not pay any of the proceeds of the sale of production until all interest owners
have signed and returned a royalty division order, which frequently takes six
months to circulate after initial production. Arata, Timely Payment of Royalties,
11 LoYOLA L. REV. 163 (1963) contains a thorough discussion of the various
possible reasons necessitating delays in payment.
The six-months standard is only a rough approximation, but it seems to this
writer that the evidence of a lessee's ability to pay prior to that time should be
strong before cancellation is permitted for a shorter delinquency.
54. The Third Circuit in the recent case of Fawvor v. United States Oil of
Louisiana, Inc., Docket No. 1085 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), in which the court
denied the demand of the lessor for cancellation because of an "appreciable"
delay without justification in the payment of production royalty where the cir-
cumstances indicated the delay probably resulted from the lessor's own conduct,
strongly suggests that the court is involved in a careful case-to-case evaluation of
the length of the delay and its justification or lack of it.
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delayed commencement of royalty payments because of his dis-
pute concerning drilling costs with the unit operator was not
considered sufficient justification. Further, the internal delays
caused by a corporate merger in Pierce were apparently unac-
ceptable as justification. Thus, the conclusion appears inevi-
table that the courts will look with disfavor upon any delays
resulting from business activities of interest to the lessee only.
As the only judicial holdings concerning justification thus far
are negative, 55 it is difficult to say exactly what might consti-
tute sufficient evidence to justify a delay. However, it does
seem that causes such as complex title problems in computation
of unit participation, negotiation of purchase contracts, and
proceedings before or compliance with regulations of adminis-
trative bodies should be acceptable.
Decisions discussing this problem in cases dealing with de-
linquent rents in the related fields of delay rentals and shut-in
payments suggest a rough standard. Good faith on the part of
the lessee is an absolute requisite,56 and the reasonableness of
his conduct under the circumstances must be shown clearly.57
When the breach is unintentional, the courts apparently distin-
guish between unilateral error or mistake and mutual mistake
or acquiescence in the lessee's mistake by the lessor or error by
a third party. 8 If the error is in the latter group the equities
may be more nearly equal, and thus the court is more likely to
sustain the defense by the lessee of justifiable failure to pay.59
55. Melancon gives the only positive indication of what conduct may be con-
sidered sufficient justification. "A justifiable cause for delay in such payment
might arise when there is a reasonable dispute as to those entitled to receive the
royalties, or the amount due each." 230 La. 597, 614, 89 So. 2d 135, 142 (1956).
56. Rudnick v. Union Producing Co., 209 La. 943, 950, 25 So. 2d 906, 908
(1946) ; Brewer v. Forest Gravel Co., 172 La. 828, 135 So. 372 (1931).
57. See note 56 supra.
58. Unilateral mistake or error resulted in cancellation of the lease in the
following cases. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 217 La. 576, 46 So. 2d
907 (1950); Andrus v. Tidewater Oil Co., 189 La. 142, 179 So. 61 (1938);
Clingman v. Devonian Oil Co., 188 La. 310, 177 So. 59 (1937); LeRosen v.
North Central Texas Oil Co., 167 La. 1076, 120 So. 862 (1929). In Jones v.
Southern Natural Gas Co., 213 La. 1051, 36 So. 2d 34 (1948) cancellation was
denied because of mutual mistakes by lessee and lessor. In Davis v. Laster, 242
La. 735, 138 So. 2d 558 (1926) ; Risinger v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 198
La. 101, 3 So. 2d 289 (1941) ; and Dellinger v. Smith, 142 La. 1009, 77 So. 947
(1918), cancellation was refused on the basis of the lessor's acquiescence in the
lessee's conduct. The court in Gloyd v. Midwest Refining Co., 62 F.2d 483 (10th
Cir. 1933) denied cancellation because the error was caused by a third person not
within the lessee's control.
59. Equity has frequently been called upon to explain the court's refusal to
cancel leases. In Lee v. Abernathy, 19 So. 2d 670, 673 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944),
the court said that "it would be extremely inequitable in view of all the facts
and circumstances of the case, to adjudge the lease null and void because of the
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However, if the lessee's error is unilateral, only in those cases
when cancellation would be an extremely unjust remedy will
the defense be sustained. 0 It is conceded that such a synthesis
offers no concrete solutions whether certain conduct is or is not
justifiable, but it does indicate the different degrees of proof
of justification which may be required in each situation.'1
It appears that if the present trend is continued, a mineral
lessee may be faced with an inference or presumption that delay
of even a few months in commencing payment of production
royalties is wilful and thus may be required to bear the burden
of proving the delay justifiable. There is perhaps some analogy
to be made between the courts' approach under the Bailey-Pierce
doctrine and the evidentiary rule of res ipsa loquitur in tort
cases; when a lessor proves that commencement of royalty pay-
ments has been delayed for an "appreciable" length of time it
is incumbent upon the lessee to demonstrate that the delay was
justifiable. Perhaps the underlying theory is the same as in tort
cases- evidence as to the cause of the delay is principally in
his possession and control.
THE DEFAULT REQUIREMENT
Both the Bailey and Pierce decisions appear to be strong at-
tempts on the part of the appellate courts to avoid the default
requirement. A sound argument can be made for the proposition
that under the facts of both cases putting in default could have
been found, thus avoiding the present question.6 2 If avoidance
brief delay in paying the rentals." Similar declarations are found in Rudnick v.
Union Producing Co., 209 La. 943, 25 So. 2d 906 (1946), and in Brewer v. Forest
Gravel Co., 172 La. 828, 135 So. 372 (1931). The most recent Supreme Court
declaration on the subject supports this liberal approach. " 'There is ample au-
thority for the proposition that considerations of equity may prevent a forfeiture
of a mineral lease where the failure of the lessee to pay the .. . rentals . .. is
the result of a mistake on his part, and where the circumstances are such that
the mistake is a pardonable one . . .', Jones v, Southern Natural Gas Co., 213
La. 1051, 36 So. 2d 34." Davis v. Laster, 242 La. 735, 755, 138 So. 2d 558, 565
(1962).
60. Lee v. Abernathy, 19 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1944).
61. Following their lead in declaring the judicial ascertainment and retention
of producing lease acreage clauses inapplicable in cases of mere failure timely
to pay delay rentals, Talley v. Lawhorn, 150 La. 25, 90 So. 427 (1922), or failure
to drill within the term of the lease, Producers Oil & Gas Co. v. Continental
Securities Corp., 188 La. 564, 177 So. 668 (1937), the Supreme Court in Melan-
con concluded that the judicial ascertainment clause and the productive acreage
provision are equitable provisions for the exclusive benefit of the lessee and con-
sequently can apply only to a "bonafide dispute as to which there is a real dis-
agreement in good faith between the parties" and not to mere negligent failures
to perform. 230 La. 593, 624, 89 So. 2d 135, 146 (1956).
62. In both Bailey and Pierce notice of a desire for payment had reached the
lessee, but in neither case was the notice held to have been a putting in default.
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of the default requirement was a motivating force in these de-
cisions, however, one may question the propriety of eliminating
the default requirement in instances when the date for perform-
ance is not contractually established.
As previously noted, it is the fact that there is no time fixed
for the initial royalty payment in most present lease forms
which makes these royalty cases unique. Assuming that sum-
mary eviction procedures might be available to a mineral lessor,
it seems that a demand fixing a time for performance would
still be necessary to give the lessor the right to evict his lessee.
The same is also true if cancellation is sought under general
contract law for occurrence of the implied resolutory condition
as a result of breach of an obligation of the lease by mere fail-
ure to perform. The simple fact is that there is no appointed
time for fulfillment of the rental obligation and some sort of
demand should be required.
There was some discussion of the possibility of establishing
a due date for the initial royalty payment by custom of the in-
dustry in the Pierce case.68 However, because factors effecting
the delay between completion and commencement of royalties
vary so widely, there seems little possibility of establishing the
due date by an industry custom.
The general law concerning dissolution of contracts affords
only two possibilities other than the approach taken by the
courts in Bailey and Pierce by which the necessity for default
could have been averted. The Civil Code provides in article
1933(1) that formal default is unnecessary if the contract is
one in which time is of the essence. 4 It is difficult to see how
the commencement of production royalties could be termed an
obligation in which time is of the essence. There is no due date
for performance which might indicate that the parties regarded
time as being of the essence. Further, even if a due date were
63. Judge Frug6, in Pierce, discusses the industry custom of paying produc-
tion royalty monthly, and intimates that such a custom applied to the initial
payment would give the lessee one month following production to commence pay-
ments. Judge Tate, concurring in Pierce, states that "under the literal terms of
the lease, the producer owed the landowner his royalties as rent for the use of
his resources from the moment the oil was produced or that the producer realized
the proceeds of production." 140 So. 2d 19, 30 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
64. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 1933(1) (1870): "When the thing to be given or
done by the contract was of such a nature, that it could only be given or done
within a certain time, which has elapsed, or under circumstances which no longer
exist, the debtor need not be put in legal delay to entitle the creditor to damages."
As interpreted by the jurisprudence, the article is applicable to suits for dissolu-
tion as well. See note 65 infra.
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fixed, the jurisprudence does not regard this as automatically
classifying the obligation as one in which time is of the es-
sence.6 5
A second possible approach which might avoid the necessity
for default is found in two early opinions by Justice Provosty 6
in which he declared that when an obligee no longer desires per-
formance of an obligation not performed within the time stipu-
lated, the failure does not require him to call upon the obligor
to perform as a prerequisite to cancellation. 7 A formal demand
would be necessary only as a prerequisite to recovery of future
damages resulting from the delay in performance.68 However,
the Louisiana jurisprudence does not appear to support Justice
Provosty's position. 9 Even so, there is normally no due date
for performance of the obligation under discussion. There seems
to be general agreement that when no time for performance has
been stipulated by contract and cannot be implied by custom, a
formal default is a prerequisite to suit for dissolution.70 The
fact that no time for performance has been stipulated is viewed
65. Although there are a few cases to the contrary (Kinsell & Locke, Inc. v.
Kohlman, 12 La. App. 575, 126 So. 257 (Orl. Cir. 1930); Shelby Mills, Inc. v.
Sheed Naini, 1 La. App. 116 (Orl. Cir. 1924)), the majority position holds that
expiration of a term fixed in the contract for performance does not automatically
put the delinquent obligor in default. Erwin v. Fenwick, 6 Mart.(N.S.) 229
(1827) (leading case). French doctrinal writings are in accord with Erwin.
2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS n 97 (8th ed. 1935) ; 3 TOULLIER
LE DaOIT CIVIL FRANQAIS n 244 (1846) : "[I]n French jurisprudence, the expira-
tion of the time fixed by the contract did not in general suffice, and still does
not suffice today in order to put the debtor in default." Similarly, the common
law requirements for demand of performance are not waived by fixing a date for
performance unless the contract is one where "time is of the essence." RESTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS § 276 (1932).
66. Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate v. Houssiere-Latreille Oil Co., 119 La.
791, 44 So. 481 (1907) ; Murray v. Barnhart, 117 La. 1023, 42 So. 489 (1906).
67. As said in Jennings-Heywood Oil Syndicate v. Houssiere-Latreille Oil Co.,
119 La. 791, 857, 44 So. 481, 503 (1907) : "Our law enforces no such fanciful
notion as that, after a contractor has violated his contract by not performing it
'at the time stipulated,' the contractee who no longer desires to have the contract
performed must call upon him to perform, and that if this is not done the time
for performance continues to run indefinitely."
68. 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1318 (1959); 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT,
DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS n 99 (8th ed. 1935). Since the Civil Code gives the court
discretion in most cases to dissolve the contract or allow more time for perform-
ance (article 2047), requiring a demand for performance -apparently the sine
qua non to maintenance of a suit for dissolution -seems to be a wasted and
superfluous act.
69. See note 18 supra and Pierce, Bailey, and Melancon.
70. Temple v. Lindsay, 182 La. 22, 161 So. 8 (1935) ; 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT,
DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS n 97 (8th ed. 1935) ; 3 TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS
n
°
- 241-251 (1846). Toullier's research indicates that in Roman law as well,
default was a prerequisite to suit when the contract fixed no time for perform-
ance. Id. no 241.
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as evidence of an intent that the obligation be performed at the
will of the debtor; until demand is made the creditor is pre-




It thus appears that the courts in Bailey and Pierce could
not have avoided the requirement of formal default by any
means other than by stretching the active breach concept. Fur-
thermore, these two decisions, which permit dissolution without
default even though no date for performance was specified in
the lease, are out of harmony with the structure of the Civil
Code and the jurisprudence.
EVALUATION OF CANCELLATION AS A REMEDY
In all common law jurisdictions, save South Dakota where
the remedy is governed by statute, cancellation for mere failure
to pay production royalties is not permitted.7 2 Damages for
breach of the lease covenants are considered a sufficient rem-
edy.73
While Louisiana law makes provision for such damages, it
does not limit the remedies available to the lessor in the same
manner as the common law. 74 In the absence of special agree-
ment dissolution may be sought as a remedy for failure to ful-
fill the obligations of a contract ;75 however, as previous analysis
has indicated, the circumstances under which it may be granted
vary. Nevertheless, two principles adopted by Louisiana courts
should permit them to temper the use of the remedy of cancella-
tion of mineral leases to avoid injustice. First, when an obligor
is willing and able to perform his obligation even though after
maturity, the courts do not favor annulment of contracts. 76 Sec-
71. See note 71 supra.
72. 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 656.3 (1962).
73. Axis Petroleum Co. v. Taylor, 108 P.2d 978 (Cal. App. 2d 1941) ; Edwards
v. Iola Gas Co., 69 Pac. 350 (Kan. 1902) ; Wakefield v. Sunday Lake Mining
Co., 49 N.W. 135 (Mich. 1891); 3 WILLIAMS & MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW
§ 656.3-.5 (1962).
74. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1934 (1870) : "Where the object of the contract is
anything but the payment of money, the damages due to the creditor for its breach
are the amount of the loss he has sustained, and the profit of which he has been
deprived .... ." When the obligation breached was to pay money, damages due
are the legal interest.
75. Id. art. 1926: "On the breach of any obligation to do, or not to do, the
obligee is entitled either to damages, or, in cases which permit it, to a specific
performance of the contract, at his option, or he may require the dissolution of
the contract . .. ."
76. As stated in Hemsing v. Wiener-Loeb Grocery Co., 157 La. 189, 192, 102
So. 303, 304 (1924) : "Our law does not contemplate that a contract shall be
annulled by one party, where the other party is able and willing to perform his
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ond, as indicated earlier, cancellation for occurrence of the im-
plied resolutory condition is expressly made subject to judicial
discretion by the Civil Code and the jurisprudence. 77
Certainly a lessor should not have the burden of placing his
lessee in formal default to collect each and every royalty pay-
ment as it becomes due. However, cancellation of a lease into
which the lessee may have invested hundreds of thousands of
dollars for failure to make the initial royalty payment as a re-
sult of mere neglect seems to be an unnecessarily harsh remedy,
particularly when the lessee is ready, willing and able to make
payment.
Obviously, the courts are struggling with a problem which
the provisions of our Civil Code were not designed to meet. It
is desirable that mineral lessees commence payment of produc-
tion royalties with all due expedition. Therefore, some legal
spur to assure such diligence is necessary. Louisiana courts
seem to have found the only available remedy in cancellation.
The fact that the only damages recoverable for nonpayment of
money take the form of interest may have had considerable in-
fluence in this regard. 78 Nevertheless, it is suggested that can-
cellation is an unjust remedy except in those instances such as
Melancon when the refusal is deliberate, in bad faith, and for a
purpose such as coercing action by the lessor.
CONCLUSIONS
Developments in this area may take one of several courses.
The Supreme Court may continue to deny writs in similar cases,
permitting propagation of the Bailey-Pierce doctrine. It is sub-
mitted that this is undesirable. As already suggested, the fiction
own part of it as soon as demanded of him." See also Watson v. Feibal, 139 La.
375, 71 So. 585 (1916).
77. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2047 (1870) ; Rudnick v. Union Producing Co., 209
La. 943, 25 So. 2d 906 (1946) ; Brewer v. Forest Gravel Co., 172 La. 828, 135
So. 372 (1931). The necessity for judicial intervention is evident from the fact
that the amount or degree of non-performance justifying resolution is an objective
quality which no party to the contract can measure without bias. The Code addi-
tionally provides that where judicial action is necessary to dissolve the contract,
the court, in its discretion, may grant further time for performance. However,
article 2729 theoretically restricts the judge's discretion in the field of leases by
declaring that the judge cannot order a delay in dissolution when either the lessee
or lessor is guilty of "neglect . .. to fulfill his engagements." For a discussion
of article 2046 and the implied resolutory condition, see Comment, 12 TUL. L.
REV. 376 (1937). See notes 11-15 supra.
78. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1935 (1870): "The damages due for delay in the per-
formance of an obligation to pay money are called interest."
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utilized in these decisions is out of harmony with the structure
of our codes and the prior jurisprudence.
A second development may take place by action within the
industry. As has been the case in the past, the industry may
react to the courts' action by drafting lease forms incorporating
a formula for determining the due date of the initial production
royalties. This solution has been adopted in the new state lease
form which specifically provides for a 120-day term running
from the commencement of production and spells out require-
ments for putting in default for failure to pay production roy-
alty, both initial and subsequent. 79 From discussions with in-
dustry personnel and practitioners, it is the writer's opinion
that in an effort to protect lessees' interests from more adverse
decisions in this area, standard lease forms in the near future
will include a term within which the initial production royalty
payment is due and will specifically require default as a pre-
requisite to enforce contractual remedies or to cancel the lease
contract.
The possibility of such a solution raises questions regarding
its effectiveness. Fixing a term for initial production royalty
payment would secure for the industry a period during which
cancellation could not in the ordinary course of affairs be
granted. On the other hand, a fixed date would tie the hands of
the lessee in those cases where serious problems are encountered
resulting in an extended period before initial payment can be
made. Thus care will be necessary in drafting to assure that
payment may be made after the specified term with appropriate
penalties to avoid cancellation. A poorly worded clause of this
kind could be interpreted as an express resolutory condition.
Creating a term may also affect the applicability of summary
eviction to this lease obligation. If the time for payment is
fixed, summary eviction may be available to the lessor. Again,
care in drafting may avoid undesired results for the lessee.
79. The seventh paragraph of clause six in the newest state lease form incor-
porates the entirely new concept of a due date for the initial payment of produc-
tion royalties. Payment shall be made to the state within 120 days after com-
mencement of production, with subsequent rentals due on the 25th day of each
month for the oil production from the previous month, and the 25th day of the
second month following the production or processing of gas. Delinquency results
in a 6% interest rate, which is stipulated to be in lieu of the state's right to
cancel for nonpayment of royalties. In any case the lessee is not to be considered
in default until written notice is made by the lessor and no payment is made
within 60 days of such notice.
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Of course, it is also possible that insertion of clauses of this
type may not be satisfactory to lessors in many instances.
Lessors' attorneys may find the prospect of interest as the sole
compensation for failure to commence or continue payment of
production royalties unacceptable. Therefore, the industry may
be forced to accept some penalty more stringent than mere in-
terest.
A third possible course is for the legislature to promulgate
statutes governing the problem. In this writer's opinion, if a
delay is unreasonable under the circumstances, the best solution
would be to provide special damages (e.g., treble damages) for
the delay. The guiding principle should be to encourage greater
alertness on the part of the lessee to make royalty payments
promptly, yet at the same time eliminate the severity of cancel-
lation as the appropriate remedy. Although such legislation
would definitely appear to be remedial in nature, there is always
the possibility that it would be held inapplicable to previously
executed contracts. Therefore, the problem may not die with
enactment of legislation.
John J. Graham
DEPTH BRACKET ALLOWABLE DETERMINATION AND
PRORATION OF OIL PRODUCTION IN LOUISIANA*
Proration of Production
The basic purpose of the Louisiana Conservation Act is to
prevent both above and below ground waste of valuable min-
eral resources. The act recognizes that waste below ground can
occur as the result of insufficient reservoir control which per-
mits dissipation of the natural forces that aid in lifting oil and
gas to the surface or withdrawal of petroleum unevenly from
the reservoir formation, thus seriously reducing the amount re-
coverable from a given pool.' Above ground waste is defined as
"inefficient storing of oil and the producing of oil or gas from
*Acknowledgment and special appreciation is given to the staff of the De-
partment of Conservation in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, especially Messrs. J. W.
Hecker, F. Kring, Jr., and A. F. Peterson, whose personal interest and assistance
made this Comment possible.
1. LA. R.S. 30:3(1)(a) (1950).
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